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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
strued together with the conversion privilege, and that when so construed,
the option to convert must be held to terminate when the option to re-
deem is exercised. Thus the determining question is whether the option to
redetn is considered as exercised at the time of the publication of the first
notice or whether all notices must have been published. In a Missouri
case, a non-resident landowner contesting a drainage tax bill which required
notice by publication for four successive weeks contended that there was no
notice at all until the last publication, after which he must be allowed time
to respond to the notice, but the court refused to uphold this contention.
State ex rel. v. Blair (1912) 245 Mo. 680, 151 S. W. 148. In the principal
case, it is apparent that the holder had actual notice, and the court, without
going as far as it did, might reasonably have held this sufficient. A Ken-
tucky case held that where a claimant of land had actual notice of prior
equities, he could not rely on lack of notice simply because the proceedings
from which he acquired notice were extra-judicial so that he could not be
charged with constructive notice. Hart v. Hawkins (Ky. 1814) 3 Bibb.
502.
The reasoning of the Circuit Court of Appeals seems the more equitable,
because it prevents a holder of bonds with both a redemption and a con-
version privilege from realizing profits not contemplated by the contract by
a bit of manipulation when the corporation seeks to call in its bonds.
H. C. H., '31.
CRImINAL LAW-ACCESSORIES-PURCHASERS OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR.-
The defendant was charged with unlawfully and knowingly having pur-
chased intoxicating liquor fit for use for beverage purposes, in violation of
the National Prohibition Act. Prosecution was brought under .sec. 6, tit. 2,
41 Stat. 310, (1919) 27 U. S. C. sec. 16, which provides that, "No one shall
manufacture, sell, purchase, transport or prescribe any liquor without first
obtaining a permit from the commissioner to do so." Held, the purchaser
was not guilty of any violation of the National Prohibition Act because the
section of the act prosecuted under was applicable only to abuse of the
legal and controlled traffic in liquor and had nothing to do with illegal and
unrestricted sales. U. S. v. Farrar (1930) 50 S. Ct. 425.
This is the first decision on the point under the National Prohibition Act,
but it has always been held in states which had local prohibition laws that
the purchaser of liquor was not guilty of violating that prohibition regula-
tion in the absence of express law to the contrary. Commonwealth v.
Willard (Mass. 1839) 22 Pick. 476; Lott v. U. S. (Alaska 1913) 205 F. 28;
U. S. v. Katz (1926) 271 U. S. 354; Brister v. State (1924) 97 Tex. Crim.
395. Courts are inclined to interpret the law literally and hold that if the
legislature has not made a proviso holding the purchaser guilty there is no
reason for finding him so for some other reason or on some other grounds.
Furthermore, since the purchaser of liquor is usually the chief source of
evidence against the seller, the rule against self-incrimination would hinder
the prosecution of the more important cases. Because of the same con-
siderations the purchaser is not considered an accessory to the crime of
selling liquor.
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Under a separate and distinct charge of conspiracy to violate the Prohi-
bition Act and under conditions pertinent thereto the purchaser can be
prosecuted with the seller as a party to the conspiracy. De Witt v. U. S.
(1923) 291 F. 995; U. S. v. Slater (1922) 278 F. 266; U. S. v. Vanaxtta
(1922) 278 F. 559; U. S. v. Kerper (1928) 29 F. (2d) 744. But there must
be actual planning by the purchaser with the seller to justify a conviction
on this ground. So it seems clear that the casual buyer of liquor can be
charged neither with violating the National Prohibition Act nor with con-
spiracy to violate it. C. F. G., '32.
EMINENT DOMAIN-PoWER OF DOMESTIC CoRroRATioN ACTING IN INTER-
EST OF FOREIGN CoRPoRATIoN.-The case of Patterson Orchard Co. v. South-
west Ark. Utilities Corp. (Ark. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d) 1028, furnishes an
example of judicial interpretation of a constitutional provision with the
view to avoiding injurious effects and to facilitating economic enterprises
despite a relatively clear contrary intention in the provision itself. Held,
a domestic corporation, organized by employees of a foreign corporation,
which had been unsuccessful in condemning a right of way because foreign
corporations were prohibited by the state constitution from taking property
within the state, has power to condemn a right of way for an electric trans-
mission line and immediately lease it to the foreign corporation.
The decision is in line with the weight of authority, as exemplified by the
comparatively few cases passing on the question. At an early date, Lower
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1882) 59 Iowa 563, 13 N. W. 718, and In re
Staten Island Rapid Transit Co. (1886) 103 N. Y. 251, held that a domestic
corporation could condemn land for a railroad right of way, with the ex-
press design of procuring the right of way for a foreign corporation. In
Postal Telegraph & Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line Co. (1901) 23 Utah
474, 65 Pac. 735, the court said, "There is nothing in the letter, spirit, or
policy of the law which prohibits the same person from forming and con-
ducting two or more different corporations." In 20 C. J. 543, the rule is
stated: "The fact, however, that a foreign corporation is interested in a
domestic corporation, or owns the greater part of its stock and controls
its management, will not prevent the latter from exercising the power of
eminent domain." In Shepherdstown Light & Water Co. v. Lucas et al.
(W. Va. 1929) 148 S. E. 847, it was held that ownership by a non-resident
corporation of controlling stock in a public service corporation deprives the
latter of the power to condemn property. See also Snyder v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co. (1904) 210 Pa. 500, 60 Atl. 151. In Potter v. Gardner (Ky. 1928)
1 S. W. (2d) 537 it was held that foreign telegraph and telephone com-
panies need not domesticate themselves to be entitled to condemn right
of way across private property.
But in In re N. Y., L. & W. R. Co. (1885) 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27, it was
held that if the fact were established that the taking was not for the pur-
pose of enlarging the railroad company's road but for the sole benefit of a
foreign lessee an injunction should issue against the condemnation proceed-
ings. And Nebraska courts hold that a domestic railroad company cannot
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